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Domestic and Trade Tax Reforms in the Presence of a Public Good and  
Different Neutrality Conditions 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the factors that have been inhibiting a faster progress on trade 
liberalization in many developing countries is the heavy dependence on trade taxes as 
a source of government revenue. For example, in the early 1990s, almost 40% of tax 
revenue in Pakistan came from trade taxes (Lahiri and Nasim, 2005). As a result, 
many countries have been, with active encouragement and help from international 
institutions such as the IMF, reforming their domestic tax policies along with trade 
liberalization in order to offset the negative effect of trade liberalization on tax 
revenue.  
In view of the above changes in actual policy reforms, the literature on tax 
reforms which earlier considered reforms of one set of policies at a time,
1 has been 
examining the effects of simultaneous reforms of trade and domestic taxes (see, for 
example, Diewert et al., 1989; Beghin and Karp, 1992; Michael et al., 1993; 
Hatzipanayotou et al., 1994, Abe, 1995; Neary, 1998; Keen and Ligthart, 2002; Lahiri 
and Nasim, 2005; Emran, 2005).
2 Most of these studies consider a link between the 
reforms of the two sets of instruments via a “neutrality” condition. In Diewert et al. 
(1989), Michael et al. (1993) and Lahiri and Nasim (2005) the neutrality is in tax 
revenue; in Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) consumer 
prices are kept constant, and in Emran (2005) the neutrality is in producer prices.
3 All 
the studies examine the effect of tax reforms on welfare, and the studies that do not 
impose revenue constraints also examine the effect on tax revenue.
4 
                                                 
1 Hatta (1977a, 1977b) are among the pioneering studies in the field of trade and domestic tax/subsidy 
reform policies. While the first paper considered reforms of trade policies, the second one examined 
reforms of domestic tax policies. 
2 Emran and Stglitz (2005) and Boadway and Sato (2008) introduce an informal sector in a competitive 
framework and examine the welfare effects of trade and consumption tax reforms.    
3 All these studies consider a perfectly competitive environment. There is also a literature regarding the 
welfare and revenue implications of reforms in domestic and/or trade taxes in an imperfectly 
competitive environment, e.g., among others, Mujumdar (2004), Keen and Ligthart (2005), Davies and 
Paz (2010), Naito and Abe (2008). For example, Keen and Ligthart (2005) demonstrate that under 
imperfect competition there can be found specific cases (examples) whereby unambiguously welfare  
improving reform programs under perfect competition now become unambiguously welfare worsening.  
4 Emran and Stiglitz (2005) show that in the presence of an informal sector, a tariff is a better 
instrument for raising revenue than a consumption tax. See Keen (2007, 2008) for a critique of this 
result. Atolia (2008) introduces tax evasion, and concludes that tariff reforms accompanied by changes 
in domestic taxes, by and large, are not revenue neutral due to the existence of tax evasion. Baunsgaard 
and Keen (2005) examine the actual impact on trade liberalization on tax revenue using a Panel data on 2 
 
Reforms of trade taxes most often relate to reduction in tariffs on imports, and 
policies on exports are not explicitly dealt with as exports and imports are known to 
be symmetric: tariffs on imports are analytically equivalent to subsidies on exports. 
One notable exception is Emran (2005) who explicitly considers the welfare 
implications of a producer-price-neutral reduction in the export tax and an offsetting 
increase in the production tax of a given commodity.   
In reality, however, in developing countries what we often observe is export 
taxes and not exports subsidies. There are two main motives for imposing export 
taxes. Sometimes they are imposed to benefit domestic consumers as export taxes on 
final goods and intermediate inputs reduce consumer and domestic input prices 
respectively. Tax on rice exports by Thailand is mainly for reducing domestic 
consumer prices (Piermartini, 2004); Export tax on cotton in Pakistan is for 
stimulating domestic yarn industry (Hudson and Ethridge, 1999); in India export tax 
(at 10%) and export control (in the form of minimum export prices) on goods such as 
leathers, basmati and non-basmati rice and cotton are also for non-revenue seeking 
purposes.
5 Another motive for export taxes is simply raising tax revenue. In Ghana, 
for example, about 12% of total tax revenue in the 1990s was from export taxes, and 
cocoa is one of Ghana’s major exports (Piermartini, 2004). Thus, there are countries 
which depend a lot on revenue from tariffs on imports, and there are other countries 
which rely heavily on taxes on exports, and it is important to analyze these cases 
separately. For example, in many cases export taxes are imposed on goods that have a 
very limited domestic market. In case of Zimbabwe, 99% of tobacco production is 
exported and this good constitutes 70% of total exports by Zimbabwe (FAO, 2003). 
Similar remark applies to cocoa in the case of Ghana. For these cases, the most 
effective way of raising revenue lost due a reduction in export taxes, is to raise 
production taxes for those goods, and not consumption taxes. 
Furthermore, more often than not tax revenues are used for the provision of 
public goods and services, rather than being distributed to households in a lump-sum 
fashion. Thus, tax reforms directly affect a government’s ability to provide such 
goods and services. This important aspect of tax reforms is absent in the studies 
reviewed above, and, to the best of our knowledge, the notable exceptions are Abe 
                                                                                                                                            
several countries, and find significant negative impact of trade liberalization on the tax revenue of the 
Sub-Saharan countries. 
5 See http://finance.indiamart.com/exports_imports/exports_from_india/export_charges.html. For India, 
revenue from export taxes constitutes only 0.15% of total tax revenue. 3 
 
(1992, 1995) where not only the level of public good production but also the cost of 
producing it are endogenous.  This adds a new dimension as tax reforms affects the 
unit cost of producing public goods. Abe (1992) derives sufficient conditions under 
which a piecemeal tariff reform and the uniform change in all tariffs improve welfare 
in a small open economy with public good production. Abe (1995) uses the same 
model structure as in Abe (1992), but considers reforms of tariffs and consumption 
taxes, without linking the two via any neutrality condition.    
We construct a perfectly-competitive general-equilibrium model of a small 
open economy which produces many traded goods and a non-traded public 
consumption good, as in Abe (1992, 1995). Tax revenues are used to finance the 
production of the public good.  In order to differentiate between developing countries 
that rely on tariffs on imports from those who depend on export taxes, for revenue 
purposes, we consider reforms that involve (i) a decrease in export taxes and an 
increase in production taxes, and (ii) a reduction in tariffs and an increase in 
consumption taxes.  For (i) we impose a producer-price neutrality condition, and for 
(ii) the neutrality is on consumer prices. For both (i) and (ii) we consider three types 
of reforms.  While in the first reform, the trade tax, i.e., the tariff or the export tax, on 
the good with the highest tax burden is reduced; in the second reform all trade taxes 
are reduced. Finally, the third reform is a partial tax-revenue neutral one where tax 
revenue evaluated at the initial equilibrium is held constant. One of the advantages of 
the third type of reforms over a reform that keeps tax revenue per se constant is that 




2. The Model 
We consider a small, Heckscher-Ohlin, perfectly competitive open economy 
producingK  private traded goods, and a privately produced public consumption good 
() g .
7 The country is endowed with a number of fixed factors, which are used in the 
production of the private and the public goods.  Production functions of the private 
                                                 
6 Delipalla and Keen (1992) examine a partial revenue-neutral reform of ad valorem and specific 
consumption taxes. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997) examine the welfare effect of tariff reduction 
when the loss of revenue is compensated by foreign aid in a partial revenue-neutral manner. 
7 The assumption of producing a single public good is made for analytical simplicity and tractability of 
the results. Alternatively, assuming that many public goods are either locally produced or imported at 
fixed world prices, presents cumbersome analytical complications without much intuitive contribution 
for the results.  4 
 
and public goods are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in all factors. The 
country is a price taker in world commodity markets.
8 The international prices of all 
private goods are assumed fixed and for simplicity are normalized to be equal to one. 
Various taxes exist on all goods in the form of ad-valorem domestic taxes, i.e., 
production and consumption taxes, and trade taxes, i.e., export taxes and import 
tariffs. Thus, for the 
th j commodity, the domestic prices for consumers () j π and 
producers  () j p  are respectively given by  (1 )(1 ) j jj t π τ = ++  and (1 )(1 ) j jj pt s =+ − , 
where an export tax is denoted by  0 j t < and a tariff is denoted by 0 j t > ;  j τ  and  j s  
respectively denote a consumption and production tax on the j
th commodity.  
The revenue function, (,) R pggives the economy’s maximum revenue from 
production of the traded private goods, at producers price vector 1 ( ..... ) K p pp ′≡ ,
9and 
level of public good() g .
10 The (,) R pgfunction is convex and homogeneous of degree 
one in producer prices, i.e.,  pp R  is a () K K ×  positive semi-definite matrix and by the 
envelop theorem  (/ )




g RC =− , where 
g C is the unit cost of the public good, and  0 gg R =  due to our 
assumption of a Heckscher-Ohlin economy.
12 The property 
g
g RC = −  implies that a 
unit increase in public good production causes a reduction in the value of production 
of private goods equal to its unit cost.  
In the demand side of this economy, we assume a number of identical 
households who consume the K  privately produced commodities and the public good
() g . A representative household’s preferences are captured by the expenditure 
function  (,,) E gu π  denoting the minimum expenditure on private goods required to 
achieve a level of utility() u , at consumer price vector 1 ( ..... ) K π ππ ′≡ , and 
                                                 
8 This is a standard assumption of the literature of indirect tax reforms made, by and large, for 
analytical convenience. That is, terms of trade considerations are unaccounted for.    
9 Unless otherwise stated, all vectors are column vectors and for a vector x, the transpose of it is 
denoted by  x′. 
10 See Abe (1992) for a detailed derivation of the private sector’s revenue function  (,) Rpgin the 
presence of production of a public good.  
11 Hereon, subscripts to all functions denote partial derivatives.  
12 The assumption  0 gg R = implies that changes in g , which change factor supplies available for the 
production of private goods, do not affect its unit cost of production. Such would be the case in a 
conventional H-O model, where factor prices are determined by commodity prices and are independent 
of changes in factor endowments when the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of factors. 5 
 
consumption of the public good. The  (,,) E gu π function is increasing inπ , andu, 
decreasing in  g and concave in π  i.e., Eππ  is a () K K ×  negative semi-definite 
matrix.  The derivative  /
j j EE π π =∂ ∂ is the compensated demand for good() j , u E , the 
inverse of the marginal utility of income. Following standard practice of the public 
finance literature, we call  0 g E −> the economy-wide “marginal willingness to pay for 
the public good provision” (e.g., see King, 1986).  
The country’s income-expenditure identity requires that private spending on 
goods must equal income from production of private and of the public goods. That is,   
             (,,) (,) (,) g E gu Rpg g R pg π = − ,                                                                    (1) 
Government tax revenues () Τ are generated from taxes on production, 
consumption, tariffs and export taxes. That is: 
     q () q 1 (,) ( 1 ) (,,) (,,) (,) pp p Ts t Rp g t E g ut E g u Rp g E R ππ π τπ π θ ϕ ⎡⎤ ′′ ′ ′ ′ =+ ++ + − = + ⎣⎦ ,    (2)                               
 
where  q (1 ) tt θ τ =+ + denotes the vector of total  tax burden rates on consumption of 
goods and  q (1 ) ts t ϕ =+ −  is the vector of total tax burden rates on the production of 
goods, t, sand τ  are the vectors of trade, production and consumption taxes, a ”hat” 
over a variable, e.g.,  q ( ) 1 t + , denotes a diagonal matrix.
13 Moreover, Eπ  and p R , 
respectively, are the vectors of compensated demand and supply functions. The 
government uses all the collected tax revenues to finance the production of the public 
good, i.e.,  (,) g gR p g − . The government budget constraint can be written as follows: 
(,) 0 g BTg Rp g =+ =,                                                                                     (3)                              
where B  denotes the net government’s budget.  
                                                 
13 Both the θ  and ϕ  vectors contain positive and negative elements. If the 
th j  commodity is an 
imported one, then the corresponding  j θ element is positive indicating an overall consumption tax-
cum-tariff burden, and the corresponding  j ϕ element is negative, i.e., a net production subsidy, if
() /1 j jj ts s >− . If the 
th j commodity is an exported one, then the corresponding  j ϕ element is 
positive indicating an overall production tax-cum-export tax burden, and the corresponding  j θ element 
is negative, i.e., a net consumption subsidy, if   ( ) /1 j jj t τ τ <− + . 6 
 
We conclude this section by deriving the effects of changes in domestic and 
trade taxes on gross government revenues and on welfare. Using the definitions of the 
(.) Eπ  and  (.) p R  functions, we differentiate equation (2) to obtain:
  
 
() () ( ) u g pg pp p dT E du E R dg E E d R R dp ππ π π π θθ ϕ θ π ϕ ′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ =+ + + + + − ,       (4) 
where  q ( ) q () 11 dd t d d t πθ τ τ ⎡ ⎤ ==+ + +
⎣ ⎦
 and  q ( ) q () 11 dp d t ds s dt ϕ ⎡ ⎤ =− =− + − −
⎣ ⎦
,  u Eπ
is a (1 ) K × vector whose elements are positive assuming that all goods are normal in 
consumption, i.e.,  0,
ju Ej K π >∀ ∈;  g Eπ is a (1 ) K × vector whose elements capture the 
relationship between the private and public goods in consumption, and are positive if 
the 
th j private good and the public good are complements in consumption, and 
negative if the 
th j private good and the public good are substitutes. Holding utility 
constant and assuming that () g  is a normal commodity not all elements of the  g Eπ
vector can be positive. Similarly,  pg R  is a (1 ) K × vector whose 
th k  element if 
negative it indicates that the 
th k  private good is a substitute in production to the 
public good, and if it is positive it indicates that the 
th k  private good is a complement 
in production to the public good. Holding factor endowments constant, not all 
elements of the pg R vector can be positive either.
14  
Differentiating equations (1) and (3), using equation (4) recalling that  0 dB =  
and rearranging terms we obtain:  
  udu Ε () gp g p E dg E d R gR dp π π ′′ ′ =− − + − ,                                                         (5) 
  
  () ( ) ( ) g pg g u p pp gp E R R dg E du E E d R R gR dp ππ π π π θϕ θ θπ ϕ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ++ = − − + + −− .     (6) 
 
 Equation (5) indicates that, other things being equal, welfare rises with an increase in 
the public good provision; it falls with an increase in consumer prices, while an 
increase in producer prices entails an ambiguous welfare effect depending on the 
                                                 
14 On the basis of the above, the public good cannot be an overall complement to private goods in 
consumption and production. 
 7 
 
induced change in the unit cost of the public good. Equation (6) indicates how prices 
and utility affect the provision of the public good. An increase in utility affects the 
consumption levels via an income effect and therefore tax revenue. Consumer prices 
affect the tax base as well as the consumption levels. Producer price has an additional 
effect by changing the unit cost of producing the public good. Equations (5) and (6) 
are the main equations of the model. They’re used to examine the effects of indirect 
tax reforms on the levels of public good provision and of welfare. That is, we design 
reforms of production or consumption taxes and of import tariffs or export taxes that 
can result in an increase in the provision of the public good and an improvement of 
welfare. We consider the following cases.  
Case I: the proposed indirect tax reform entails, first, a simultaneous decrease in the 
export tax and an increase in the production tax on a 
th k commodity, i.e., a piecemeal 
reform, so that its producer price is held constant; second, a simultaneous decrease in 
all export taxes and an increase in all production taxes, so that all producer prices 
remain constant. This we call a “producer-price-neutral” indirect tax reform. 
Case II: the proposed indirect tax reform entails, first, a simultaneous decrease in the 
import tariff and an increase in the consumption tax on a 
th k commodity, i.e., a 
piecemeal reform, so that its consumer price is held constant; second, a simultaneous 
decrease in all tariffs and an increase in all consumption taxes, so that all consumer 
prices remain constant. This we call a “consumer-price-neutral” indirect tax reform. 
Case III: is what we call partial tax revenue neutrality.  That is, reform of both export 
and production taxes or both tariffs and consumption taxes, keeping tax revenue, 
evaluated at the initial equilibrium, constant. 
Solving equations (5) and (6), changes in the levels of the public good and 
welfare due to changes in producer and consumer prices are given as follows: 
() () () uu p g p u p p uu u dg E E R gR E R dp E E E E E d ππ π π π θ ϕθ θ π ′ ′ ⎡⎤ ′′ Δ= − − − + − + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ,     (7)
   
() ( ) g g pg p gp g pp du S E R R gR E R dp π θϕ ϕ ′ ⎡⎤ ′′ Δ= −+ + − + ⎣⎦     
                 () () gg p g g SER E E E d ππ π π θ ϕθ π
′ ⎡⎤ ′′ −+ + ⎣⎦ ,                              (8) 
 
where  () ug g p g g u E RE RE E π π θϕ θ ′′ ′ Δ= + + − is the determinant of the (2x2) matrix of 
coefficients of the unknowns dg and  du, in equations (5) and (6). Following Abe 8 
 
(1995, pp. 879-880), we assume that an increase in public good provision reduces 
government net tax revenues, i.e., (/) 0 dB dg <  , and this ensures that  Δ is negative. 
Moreover,  0( 0) gg g SER =−< > depending on whether the public good is socially 
under (over)-provided. The following assumption is used in some cases in the rest of 
the analysis: 
Assumption: The public good is socially under-provided i.e., 0 gg g SER =−< . 
This is a reasonable assumption to make for a developing country. In the course of our 
analysis, however, we discuss the way our results change when this assumption is 
relaxed. 
Note also, from equation (4), that(/) g pg Tg E R π θ ϕ ′ ′ ∂ ∂= + . In the analysis to 
follow in some cases we assume that, at given domestic and trade taxes, an increase in 
the public good provision does not reduce the gross government revenues
(/) 0 Tg ∂∂ ≥ . In the course of our analysis it will be made clear how does this 
assumption affect the levels of public good provision and of welfare, due to the 
proposed tax reforms. 
 
3. Producer-price-neutral reforms of export and production taxes 
We now assume that that the government pursues a producer-price-neutral 
reform policy by simultaneously reducing export taxes and increasing production 
taxes. That is, a policy of reducing the export tax and increasing the production tax on 
a given, say
th k  good, so that its producer price is constant, i.e., a piecemeal reform, or 
a policy of reducing all export taxes and increasing all production taxes so that all 
producer prices are constant. In this case changes in consumer prices are given by
q () 1 dd d t πθ τ == + . From equations (7) and (8), the effects of the producer-price-
neutral tax reform on the levels of public good provision and of welfare are: 
      () q ( ) 1 uu u dg E E E E E dt ππ π π θθ τ ′ ′ Δ= − + + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ,                                  (9) 
() () q () 1 gg p g g du S E R E E E dt ππ π π θϕ θτ




3.1 Producer-price-neutral piecemeal reform of an export and a production tax 
We examine the effects on public good provision and on welfare of increasing 
the production tax on the 
th k exported good, i.e., 0 k ds > , and of simultaneously 
reducing its export tax i.e.,  0 k dt > , so that its producer price is held constant. Note 
that since we denote an export tax by 0 j t < , a reduction of its size implies that, 
algebraically,  j t rises.  
Equations (9) and (10) can be further elaborated on by using the properties of 
the expenditure function, i.e., compensated demand functions are homogeneous of 









= ∑  yields () /
kk jk jk
jk
EE π ππ π ππ
≠
=−∑ , 
and by the reciprocity conditions we have
jk kj EE π ππ π = . Using the above properties 
and after some manipulations, the effect of the proposed producer-price-neutral tax 









π ππ π τθ π θ θ
− −
≠
′ −+ Δ = − − − ∑ ,                          (11)   
   () () ( )
1 1 1
kk j kg g p g g k k j
jk k
du
SER E E E
dt
π ππ π τθ ϕ π θ θ
− −
≠
⎡⎤ ′′ +Δ = − + − − ⎣⎦ ∑ .        (12) 
Given that Δis negative and 0 k dt > , a public good increasing and welfare improving 
producer-price-neutral reform of production and export taxes requires that the right-
hand-side of equation (11) is positive, and that of equation(12) is negative. 
From equation (11)  we can derive sufficient conditions under which the 
proposed producer-price-neutral reform on the 
th k good raises the level of the public 
good. These conditions are, (i) the 
th k good is a substitute to all other private goods in 
consumption, and (ii) the 
th k good carries the highest net consumption subsidy relative 
to all other goods. Intuitively, the producer-price-neutral reduction of the export tax, 
which is an implicit production tax and consumption subsidy, and the increase of the 
production tax on the 
th k good leave production of all goods unchanged, reduces the 
consumption of the 
th k good and increases the consumption of all other goods 
assuming that the 
th k good is a substitute to all other goods in consumption. Since the 10 
 
consumption subsidy on the 
th k
 good is the highest then the proposed reform, ceteris 
paribus, raises consumption tax revenue which in turn raises the public good 
provision. Note that since this reform keeps the producer prices constant, it has no 
effect on the unit cost of producing the public good. 
As noted in the introduction, by and large, reforms of trade taxes have not 
dealt explicitly with policies on exports. One notable exception is Emran (2005) who 
explicitly considers the welfare implications of a producer-price-neutral reduction in 
export tax and an offsetting increase in the production tax of a given commodity, but 
without considering the provision of a public good.  
From equation (12) we can derive sufficient conditions under which the 
proposed producer-price-neutral reform on the 
th k good increases welfare. These are, 
(i) the public good is socially under-provided,  (ii) the 
th k good is a substitute to all 
other goods in consumption and it carries the highest net consumption subsidy relative 
to all other exported goods, and (iii) the increase in the level of the public good does 
not reduce government gross tax revenues, i.e.,  g pg E R π θ ϕ ′ ′ + is  non-negative. From 
equation (5), note that the above-stated conditions, i.e., conditions (i) and (ii), under 
which there is an increase in public good provision, are not sufficient for welfare to 
increase as the increase in consumer price, entailed by this reform, reduces welfare. 
There we need additional conditions, i.e., condition (iii). Assuming the existence of 
only export and production taxes, i.e., 0, 0 θ ϕ < > ,  then for condition (iii) to hold it 
suffices that the public good and all exported goods are substitutes in consumption 
and complements in production. Since, however, not all goods can be complements in 
production with the public good, condition (iii) is satisfied if the positive effect of an 
increase in () g on total consumption subsidy cost, i.e.,  0 g Eπ θ′ > , dominates the 
negative effect on total production tax revenue, i.e.,  0 pg R ϕ′ < . The following 
proposition summarizes the main results of equations (11)-(12). 
 
Proposition 1: Consider a small open economy which produces many private traded 
goods and a public consumption good financed through trade and domestic tax 
revenues. Then, a producer-price-neutral small reduction of the export tax and 
simultaneous increase of the production tax on a 
th k good:  11 
 
•  increases the provision of the public good, if the
th k good carries the highest 
net consumption subsidy relative to all other exported goods, and it is a 
substitute to all other private goods in consumption.  
•  improves welfare if: 
(i)  the public good is socially under-provided, and an increase in its level 
does not reduce government gross tax revenues,  
(ii)  the
th k good carries the highest net consumption subsidy relative to all 
other exported goods, and it is a substitute to all other goods in 
consumption. 
 
Note that in the case where the tax revenue is lump-sum distributed, condition (ii) of 
proposition 1 is necessary and sufficient for welfare improvement. In this case this 
condition is neither necessary nor sufficient.  
3.2 Producer-price-neutral reform of all export and production taxes 
We now examine the effects on public good provision and on welfare of the 
reduction in all export taxes, i.e.,  0 k dt > kK ∀ ∈ , and a simultaneous increase in all 
production taxes, i.e., 0 k ds > kK ∀∈ , so that all producer prices remain constant, i.e., 
[ ] 0( 1 ) / ( 1 ) kk k k k dp ds s t dt =⇒ = − + . Since consumption taxes are unchanged, changes 
in consumer prices are given as follows:  0 (1 ) kk k k k dd d d t τ πθ τ = ⇒== + . We 
assume the following reform in every export tax,  
1 (1 ) kk k dt τ λθ
− =+ ;λ is a positive 
scalar and k θ is the net consumption subsidy on the
th k exported good. Using the above 
two expression we get that  kk dθ λθ = . That is, this change in export and production 
taxes results in equi-proportional reduction in all net consumption subsidies. 
Therefore our producer-price-neutral reform of export and production taxes is a 
combination of a radial reform of the net consumption subsidies with fixed 
consumption taxes and the corresponding changes in export taxes keeping producer 
prices constant. 
Using equations (9) and (10), the effects on the levels of the public good and 
welfare of this producer-price-neutral reduction in all export taxes and increase in 
production taxes are given below: 
() uu u
dg
EE EE E ππ π π θ θθ θ
λ
′′ ′ Δ= − + ,                                                            (13) 12 
 
() gg p g g
du
SER E E E π ππ π θ ϕθ θ θ
λ
′ ⎡⎤ ′′′ Δ= − + + ⎣⎦ .                                              (14) 
    
Equation (13) shows that the above reform program increases the level of 
public good provision if the overall net subsidy cost on the consumption of the 
exported goods is non-negative, i.e., 0 Eπθ ′ ≤ . A sufficient but not necessary condition 
for this to occur is that all the exported goods carry a net consumption subsidy. This 
condition holds if we have only export taxes and no consumption taxes. Equation (14) 
shows that the above reform program improves welfare if, in addition to the above 
condition, the public good is under-provided and the increase in the level of the public 
good does not reduce government gross tax revenues. In case where there are only 
export and production taxes, i.e.,  0, 0 θ ϕ < > , and since not all goods can be 
complements in production to the public good, the latter condition is satisfied if the  
positive effect of an increase in () g on total consumption subsidy cost dominates its 
negative effect on total production tax revenue. These results are summarized in the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Consider a small open economy which produces many private traded 
goods and a public good financed through trade and domestic tax revenues. Assuming 
that the total consumption subsidy cost on all exported goods in not negative, then a 
producer-price-neutral reduction of all export taxes and a simultaneous increase of 
all production taxes that results in a radial reduction in all net consumption 
subsidies:  
•  increases the provision of the public good, 
•  improves welfare if the public good is under-provided and the increase in its 
level does not reduce government gross tax revenues. 
 
At this point a remark is in order, regarding the above results and our Assumption of 
social under-provision of the public good. As noted in the analysis of this section, this 
assumption has no bearing regarding the effect of the proposed reform program on the 
provision of the public good. It only affects its welfare results. Thus, in the unlikely 
case of social over-provision of the public good (i.e.,  g S  positive) the two producer-13 
 
price-neutral reform programs considered in this section, under the conditions stated 
in Propositions 1 and 2, may reduce welfare;
15 but in order to do so the over-provision 
of the public good has to be sufficiently large.   
Concluding the section we compare our results to those of the relevant 
literature. Emran (2005) in a model without public goods but with costly 
administration of tax revenues concludes that when the “cross-price substitution 
effects” in consumption between all private goods are zero, a producer-price-neutral 
reform such as the one considered here, increases government revenues and welfare if 
the consumption of the 
th k good enjoys a net subsidy and the cost of administering tax 
revenues is lower than a threshold (Emran 2005, Proposition 1, p. 284). In our 
analysis assuming zero “cross-price substitution effects” in consumption, first, the 
level of the public good unambiguously rises with a piecemeal producer-price-neutral 
reform, and it increases with the producer-price-neutral reform if the total 
consumption subsidy cost on all exported goods is not negative. Second, welfare may 
still fall with either producer-price-neutral reform program, if the increased level of 
the public good lowers government gross tax revenues.  
 
4. Consumer-price-neutral reforms of tariffs and consumption taxes 
In this section, we assume that the government pursues a consumer-price-
neutral reform policy by simultaneously reducing tariffs and increasing consumption 
taxes. That is, a policy of reducing the tariff rate and increasing the consumption tax 
on a commodity, say 
th k , so that its consumer price is constant, i.e., a piecemeal 
reform, or a policy of reducing all tariffs and increasing all consumption taxes so that 
all consumer prices are constant. In this case, changes in producer prices are given by
q () 1 dp d s dt ϕ =− = − .  
 
4.1 Consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform of a tariff and a consumption tax  
  We examine the implications on public good provision and welfare of 
simultaneously reducing the tariff rate and increasing the consumption tax on an 
imported 
th k  good so that its consumer price remains constant, i.e.,  0 k dt <   and
                                                 
15 Subsequent results of the analysis are similarly affected by this notion of under (over)-provision of 
the public good. For brevity, however, we do not raise this issue again.  14 
 
0 k dτ > , so that  ( ) 0( 1 ) / 1 kk k k k dd t d t πττ =⇒ = − + + ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ . Using the same procedure 
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π θϕ ϕ ϕ
− −
≠
⎡⎤ ′′ −Δ = + − − + − + ⎣⎦ ∑ .  (16)      
Since  Δis negative, for the consumer-price-neutral  reduction in the tariff  k t and 
increase in the consumption tax  k τ to raise the level of the public good and improve 
welfare the right-hand-sides of equations (15) and (16) must be positive.                   
  Observing equations (11) and (12), (15) and (16) one may note several 
similarities regarding the conditions under which, on the one hand, the producer-
price-neutral reforms in export and production taxes and on the other, the consumer-
price-neutral reforms in tariffs and consumption taxes increase public good provision 
and improve welfare. For this, in the remainder of the section we avoid the detailed 
algebra of the latter results, and instead we highlight key differences in them vis-à-vis 
the producer-price-neutral reforms. From equation (15) relative to equation (11), a 
factor, among others, relevant for the impact of the tariff-consumption tax consumer-
price-neutral reform on public good provision is the relationship in production 
between the 
th k private good and the public good, i.e., whether  () 0
k gp R ><  . In the 
case of the producer-price-neutral reform of export and production taxes, this 
consideration did not appear since with constant producer prices the unit cost of the 
public good remains unchanged. Thus, sufficient conditions for the present piecemeal 
consumer-price-neutral reduction in  k t and increase in  k τ to increase the supply of the 
public good and improve welfare are that the 
th k good  (i) carries the highest 
production subsidy among all goods instead of the highest consumption subsidy, (ii) 
is a substitute in production instead a substitute in consumption with all other private 
goods, and, an additional condition, (iii) it is also a substitute in production with the 
public good.  
We note three points relating our results in this section to standard results of 
the tax reforms literature with or without public good provision. First, in previous 15 
 
studies of indirect tax reforms in the presence of public good provision, e.g., Abe 
(1992, 1995), there is no explicit analysis of the impact of the proposed tax reforms 
on the provision of the public good. Second, consider the literature on a consumer-
price-neutral reform of the tariff and consumption tax on a 
th k commodity but without 
provision of a public good. There, the condition requiring that the 
th k good carries the 
highest total net production subsidy and that it is a substitute to all other private goods 
in production is a necessary and sufficient condition for improving welfare. With 
public good provision and endogenous cost of production for the public good, this 
condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for both increasing the level of the public 
good and improving welfare. Third, in the tax reform literature without public good 
provision, the 
th k commodity is the one carrying the highest tariff, an implicit 
production subsidy, relative to all other imported goods. Here with domestic and trade 
taxes, the 
th k commodity is required to carry the highest overall net production 
subsidy, without necessarily implying that it also carries the highest tariff. Finally, as 
the analysis thus far has shown, under perfectly competitive conditions, the results for 
the cases of a producer-price-neutral reform of export and production taxes and of a 
consumer-price-neutral reform of import tariffs and consumption taxes are, with the 
exception of some noted difference, by and large qualitatively similar. As mentioned 
in footnote 3, in the presence of imperfect competition the welfare implications of 
tariff and consumption tax reforms can be very different. Likewise, imperfect 
competition can make very different the qualitative results of the two reform 
programs considered here. For example, a reduction in tariffs reduces the level of 
protection awarded to domestic producers, which in turn lowers the level of their pure 
profits, and thus the level of welfare. A reduction of export taxes, under imperfect 
competition, results to the exact opposite effect. Namely, it increases the level of 
protection for the domestic firms, and thus it raises the levels of pure profits and 
welfare.      
4.2 Consumer-price-neutral reform in all tariffs and consumption taxes 
In the absence of public goods provision, a standard result of the relevant 
literature on trade and consumption tax reforms states that a simultaneous small   
reduction of all tariffs and an increase in all consumption taxes, leaving all consumer 
prices unchanged, unambiguously improves welfare and raises government tax 
revenues. In this section we examine the effects on public good provision and on 16 
 
welfare of the reduction in all tariffs, i.e.,  0 k dt < kK ∀ ∈ ,  and a simultaneous 
increase in all consumption taxes, i.e., 0 k dτ > kK ∀ ∈ , so that all consumer prices 
remain constant, i.e.,  [ ] 0( 1 ) / ( 1 ) kk k k k dd t d t πτ τ =⇒ = + + . Since production taxes 
are unchanged, changes in producer prices are given as follows: 
0( 1 ) kk k k k ds dp d s dt ϕ =⇒ = =− ;  k ϕ is the net production subsidy on the
th k imported 
good. We assume the following reform in every tariff, 
1 (1 ) kk k dt s λϕ
− =− . Using the 
above two expression we get that  kk dϕ λϕ = − . That is, the above reduction in all 
tariffs and increase in all consumption taxes that keep all consumer prices constant 
results in an equi-proportional reduction in net production subsidies. Therefore, the 
consumer-price-neutral reform of tariffs and consumption taxes is a combination of 
the uniform reduction in net production subsidies with fixed production taxes and the 
corresponding change in tariffs to keep consumer prices constant. The effects of this 
consumer-price-neutral reduction in tariffs and increase in consumption taxes are 
given as follows:  
() () uu p g pu p p
dg
EE R g R E R π θ ϕϕ ϕ
λ
′′ ′ Δ= − − − ,                                             (17) 
() () g pg g p gp g pp
du
ER S R g R E R π θ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ
λ
′′ ′ ′ Δ= + − − + .                                (18) 
Equation (17), and (18) indicates that this consumer-price-neutral reform of 
tariffs and consumption taxes raises the provision of the public good and welfare 
under similar conditions as in the case of a producer-price-neutral reform in export 
and production taxes. The differences are (i) the total production subsidy cost of all 
imported goods being nonnegative instead of the total consumption subsidy cost on all 
exported goods being nonnegative, and (ii) the additional requirement that the 
imported goods are substitutes in production to the public good.  
 
5. Reform of trade and domestic taxes under “partial tax revenue neutrality” 
In this section we consider what we call “partial tax revenue neutral” reforms  
of, first, export and production taxes holding tariffs and consumption taxes constant 
and tariffs and consumption taxes holding export and production taxes constant. 
According to either reform policy, it is assumed that tax revenue, evaluated at the 17 
 
initial equilibrium, is constant.
16  In the first “partial tax revenue neutral” reform 
program we consider a reduction in export taxes and an increase in production taxes 
for which  q q q (1 ) [ (1 ) (1 )] 0 pp dT R t ds E R s dt π τ ′ ′′ =+ ++ − −= . Thus, 
q q q
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) pp ds t R t s R dt π
−
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ′′ ′ =− + + Ε − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . Since q q (1 ) (1 ) dp s dt t ds =− −+ , we have     
p 1(1 ) p dp R s E dt π
− ′ =−  .  In the second “partial tax revenue neutral” reform program we 
consider a reduction in tariffs and an increase in consumption taxes for which
q () q q 1[ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ] 0 pp dT E t d E R s dt ππ ττ ′′ ′ =+++ −− = , from which 
q q q
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) p dt s R d t ππ ττ
−
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ′ =− + Ε + Ε − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ .
 
Since q q (1 ) (1 ) dt d d t π ττ =+ ++ , we have 
p 1(1 ) p dE s R d t π π
− ′ =− . Equations (5) and (6), after some algebra, now become:  
ˆ
ug g p E du E dg gR dt ′ += − Φ ,                                                                             (19) 
( ) ( ) ˆ
ug g p g p g p E du R E R dg R gR dt ππ θθ ϕ ′ ′′ ′ ′ ++ + = − Ψ + Φ ,                             (20) 
where,  ( )
11 ˆˆ
pp p dT E E R R dt ππ π θϕ
−− ′′ Ψ= = + ;  q 1 ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) p R Eπ τ
− Φ= +  in the case of the “partial 
tax revenue neutral” reform of export and production taxes and  q ˆ (1 ) s Φ =− in the case 
of the “partial tax revenue neutral” reform of tariffs and consumption taxes. In what 
follows we examine the effects on the levels of public good provision and of welfare 
in each of the above cases. Using the homogeneity properties of the expenditure and 
revenue functions, the effects of the proposed tax reform on the levels of () g and() u , 
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16 As mentioned in the introduction, the information requirement for this reform is very modest, 
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δ = ,  , ij k = .  
In the case of the “partial tax revenue neutral” reduction in the export tax and 
increase in the production tax on the 
th k  exported good, 
1 (1 )
kk kk p RE π τ
− Φ= + ,  i γ  and 
i δ , respectively, denote the export tax’s net consumption subsidy on the 
th i  exported 
good as a fraction of the commodity’s consumption expenditure, and the export tax’s 
total production tax burden as a fraction of its value of production.  In the case of the 
“partial tax revenue neutral” reduction in the tariff and increase in the consumption 
tax on the 
th k  good,  1 kk s Φ=− ,   i γ  and  i δ , respectively, denote the tariff’s total 
consumption tax burden on the 
th i  imported good as a fraction of the commodity’s 
consumption expenditure, and the tariff’s net production subsidy on the same good as 
a fraction of its value of production.  Equations (21) and (22), respectively, give 
sufficient conditions under which the “partial tax revenue neutral” reduction in an 
export tax (tariff rate) and increase in the production (consumption) tax of the 
th k
good raise the levels of public good provision and of welfare. These conditions are 
stated in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: Consider a small open economy producing many private traded 
goods, and a public good financed through trade and domestic tax revenues.  
•  Let the 
th k exported good be a substitute in consumption and production to all 
private goods, complement in production with the public good, and let it carry 
the highest net consumption subsidy as a fraction of its consumption 
expenditures and the highest net production tax burden as a fraction of the 
value of its production. Then, a “partial tax revenue neutral” reduction in the 
export tax rate on the 
th k good and increase of its production  tax  
(i)   raises the level of public good provision, 
(ii)  (ii) increases social welfare if the public good is under-supplied, and 
the increase in the level of the public good does not reduce government 
gross tax revenues. 
 
The conditions to increase welfare of this partial tax revenue neutral reduction 
in the tariff rate on the 
th k  good and increase in the consumption tax on the same 19 
 
commodity are similar as in the case of the partial tax revenue neutral reduction in 
the export tax and increase in the production tax on the 
th k  commodity, with only one 
difference. The only difference is that the 
th k  good must be a substitute in production, 
instead of a complement in production, with the public good. The intuition is simple, 
when we reduce the export tax on the 
th k  good, its producer price increases and the 
level of the public increases if it is complement in production with this good. In the 
case where we reduce the tariff rate on the 
th k  good, its producer price falls and the 
level of the public good increases if it is substitute in production with this good.   
The intuition of the results of this proposition follows easily from the analysis 
thus far. For example, consider the case of the “partial revenue neutral” reduction in 
the tariff and increase in the consumption tax on the 
th k  imported good. This reform, 
on the one hand, increases government revenues if, as stated in the above proposition, 
the 
th k
 imported good is a substitute in consumption and production to all private 
goods, and carry the highest total consumption tax burden as a fraction of its 
consumption expenditures and the highest net production subsidy burden as a fraction 
of the value of its production.
17 On the other hand, since the 
th k
 good and the public 
good are substitutes in production, the decrease in its tariff rate reduces the unit cost 
of production of the public good. As a result, ceteris paribus, the provision of the 
public good also increases. Welfare increases because (i) the public good is socially 
under-provided, (ii) an increase in its level does not reduce the tax revenue i.e., in 
equation (22)  () 0
k gp g g g p ER S g R π θϕ ′′ −+ − > , and (iii) due to increase in efficiency in 
consumption and production. A similar rationale can be followed for the case of the 
“partial revenue neutral” reduction in the export tax and increase in the production 
tax on the 
th k  exported good.  
In the special case of zero “cross-substitution price effects” in production and 
consumption, the “partial revenue neutral” reduction in the tariff and increase in the 
consumption tax on the 
th k  imported good (i) increases the provision of the public 
good if the 
th k private and the public goods are substitutes in production, and (ii) 
improves welfare if the public good is under-supplied and an increase in its level does 
                                                 
17 Applying the condition  q
1
(1 ) [(1 ) (1 ) ] p dt E s R d t ππ ττ
−
⎡⎤ ′ ′′ =− + Ε + − − ⎣⎦ for this “partial revenue neutral” 
tariff-consumption tax reform, the overall change in government tax revenues is given by 
p dT dE dR π θ ϕ ′′ =+ ()
k ug p g p k k Ed u E R d g R d t ππ θθ ϕ ′′ ′ =+ + + Ψ . Then,  /0
k kp k Tt R ∂ ∂= Ψ <. 20 
 
not reduce the tax revenue.  On the other hand, the “partial revenue neutral” 
reduction in the export tax and increase in the production tax on the 
th k  exported good 
(i) increases the provision of the public good if the 
th k  and the public goods are 
complements in production, and (ii) improves welfare if the public good be under-
supplied and an increase in its level does not reduce the tax revenue.  Finally, 
equations (21) and (22) indicate that if in addition to zero “cross-substitution price 
effects” in production and consumption, the public good is imported, instead of locally 
produced (i.e., its cost is fixed)  then either  of the proposed “partial tax revenue 
neutral” reforms leaves unaffected the levels of public good provision and welfare. 
  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper revisits the issue of reforming the structure of indirect taxes, e.g., 
trade taxes --tariffs and export taxes-- and domestic taxes --consumption and 
production taxes, in the context of a small open economy which produces a public 
good. The fact that the unit cost of producing the public good is endogenous in our 
model brings in additional analytical issues. Within this framework, we derive 
sufficient conditions under which specific reforms in these domestic and trade taxes 
lead to an increase in the public good and to an improvement in domestic welfare.  
The first two reforms we consider are: (i) a producer-price-neutral reduction 
in export taxes and increase in production taxes, and (ii) a consumer-price-neutral 
reduction in tariffs and increase in consumption taxes. In each reform program, the 
sufficient conditions, for increasing the level of public good provision and for 
improving the level of welfare, are summarized in the paper’s relevant propositions. 
These conditions, on the one hand, reflect certain relationships of the standard tax 
reform literature, e.g., substitutability in production and/or consumption between the 
taxed good and all other goods. On the other hand, they rely on certain relationships 
due the presence of the public good, e.g., the endogeneity of the unit cost of the public 
good, its social under (over)-provision, and its relationship to all private goods in 
consumption and production. The analysis also examines sufficient conditions under 
which a producer-price-neutral reduction in all export taxes and increase in all 
production taxes that results in a uniform reduction in all net consumption subsidies, 
and a consumer-price-neutral reduction in all tariffs and increase in all consumption 21 
 
taxes that results in a uniform reduction in all net production subsidies lead to the 
two-fold objective.   
The last reform exercise we consider is that of domestic and trade taxes 
subject to, what we call partial tax revenue neutrality. In this case, among the 
conditions relevant for ensuring the increase in public good provision and in welfare 
are the size of what we call a tariff’s total consumption tax burden as a fraction of 
consumption expenditure and net production subsidy as a fraction of value of 
production, or an export tax’s net consumption subsidy burden as a fraction of 
consumption expenditure and total production tax as a fraction of value of production.   
Some analytical limitations of our model can provide a stimulus for further 
research in this area. First, as we note in our introduction, a new strand of the tax-
reform literature focuses on the case of developing economies introducing features 
such as the existence of an informal sector, e.g., a shadow economy or a rural non-
farming sector, which may escape commodity tax coverage, or the existence of tax 
evasion. Such features may lead to shrinkage of a country’s tax basis resulting to 
lower levels of public good provision. However, informality or evasion may equally 
apply to tariffs,
18 and therefore it is possible that while the increase in consumption 
tax reduces the consumption tax base, a reduction in tariffs can compensate it by 
increasing the base for tariff revenue. Second, the paper introduced a so-called 
“partial-tax revenue-neutral” reform of domestic and trade taxes evaluating tax 
revenues at the initial equilibrium. Given, however, that optimizing firms and 
consumers respond to changes in tax rates, this reform program does not account for 
possible changes in the country’s tax basis. The present analysis of this case could be 
generalized, though it entails quite cumbersome algebraic calculations, to incorporate 
such changes in the tax basis and subsequently on the provision of public goods. 
Third, as stated, our framework is one of a small perfectly competitive open economy. 
Allowing for the existence of imperfectly competitive markets, a feature introduced in 
couple of studies in the literature of tax reforms, may bring in other analytical issues 
currently of no consideration. Finally, someone may argue that there may be 
numerous other types of reforms in domestic and trade taxes, aside to the ones 
presented here. Without overlooking such a possibility, we argue that the tax reforms 
                                                 
18 As Lahiri et al. (2000) point out, in 1993 illegal imports into Pakistan amounted to RS. 100 billion 
compared to total legal imports of Rs. 259 billion. A lot of this smuggling can be attributed to high 
tariffs on durable goods such as televisions and bicycles.   22 
 
we considered in this paper provide a natural and intuitive justification in terms of 
theory, real world practice, and policy proposals. 
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